

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 052684

11
ORIGIN OES-03

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /004 R

66611
DRAFTED BY: OES/SCI/AE:DBHOULE:MER
APPROVED BY: OES/SCI/AE:DBHOYLE
----- 129407

R 262043Z MAR 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

UNCLAS STATE 052684

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 052684 ACTION ASWAN AMMAN BEIRUT
CAIRO DAMASCUS GENEVA KUWAIT DHAHRAN JERUSALEM JIDDA KHARTOUM
MANAMA TUNIS TEL AVIV TEHRAN CINCEUR
TRIPOLI RABAT LONDON PARIS MOSCOW ROME USUN NEW YORK NATO
SANAA BAGHDAD DOHA ABU DHABI ALGIERS DUBLIN 8 MARCH.

QUOTE

UNCLAS STATE 052684

TOSEC 159

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS
FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING MARCH 7, 1975:

QUOTE: Q. THERE'S A REPORT THAT IRAN PLANS TO SUPPLY AT
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 052684

LEAST 50 F-5S TO PAKISTAN. WE'VE ASKED A QUESTION HERE A
NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE PAST AS TO THE APPLICATION OF U.S.
POLICY ON THIS. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT THE CURRENT SITUATION
IS?

A. I'M NOT AWARE OF THAT SPECIFIC REPORT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT BUT ANY TRANSFERS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHATEVER UNDERSTANDINGS WE HAD WITH THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED WHEN WE SUPPLIED THE EQUIPMENT.

Q. BUT RELATED TO THAT, THE IRANIANS, WE KNOW, HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRING ARMS TO THE KURDS. IS THAT PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN?

A. I DON'T KNOW THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE BEEN PROVIDING U.S.-SUPPLIED ARMS TO THE KURDS.

Q. WHERE ARE THE KURDS GETTING THE ARMS FROM THOUGH?

A. I DON'T REALLY THINK I WANT TO COMMENT ON THAT QUESTION. HOWEVER, I HAVE BEEN SEEING REPORTS FROM ALGIERS THAT IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE REACHED SOME SORT OF AN AGREEMENT. IF THAT'S TRUE, WE OBVIOUSLY WOULD WELCOME ANY RESTORATION OF STABILITY IN THAT AREA.

Q. THE CONGRESS PASSED AN AID CUT-OFF TO TURKEY ON THE GROUNDS THAT TURKEY ILLEGALLY USED ARMS THAT WE SUPPLIED THEM. ISN'T IRAN ALSO VIOLATING THE TERMS OF OUR AGREEMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY BY TRANSFERRING ARMS TO THE KURDS?

A. I'M NOT AWARE THAT IRAN IS VIOLATING ANY UNDERSTANDINGS IT HAS WITH US ON OUR SUPPLYING THEM WITH ARMS.

Q. WELL, DO WE KNOW WHETHER THE KURDS HAVE GOTTEN THEIR ARMS?

A. NO; I DON'T HAVE INFORMATION ON THAT.

Q. COULD YOU CHECK THAT?

A. I'LL TRY.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 052684

Q. IF I CAN RETURN TO PAKISTAN -- WHEN THE ARMS EMBARGO WAS LIFTED, IT WAS SAID THAT APPLICATIONS FOR WEAPONS WOULD BE TAKEN ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. ARE THERE ANY APPLICATIONS BEING CONSIDERED NOW?

A. I'LL HAVE TO TAKE THAT QUESTION.

Q. THERE IS A STORY IN A WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER TODAY, ABOUT AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS SUPPOSEDLY SIGNED BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES REGARDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

ONE, HAS THAT AGREEMENT BEEN REACHED, AS STIPULATED IN THIS WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER?

AND TWO, IS IRAN GOING TO BE ALLOWED TO KEEP THE PLUTONIUM AS PROCESSED BY THESE PLANTS?

A. WELL IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE AGREEMENT FOR NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN IS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WHEN THAT AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED AND ITS SIGNING IS AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT, IT WILL BE

SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS AS REQUIRED UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION.

NOW YOUR SECOND QUESTION WAS WHAT?

Q. ARE WE PREPARED TO LET THE IRANIANS KEEP THE PLUTONIUM THAT'S PROCESSED BY THIS PLANT -- THE RESULTS FROM THIS PROCESSING?

A. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT IS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION WITH THE IRANIANS, IN THE OVERALL NEGOTIATIONS.

Q. WELL MAYBE UNDER THE STANDARD SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS ON THESE NUCLEAR THINGS -- IS THAT ALLOWED? FOR THE COUNTRY TO KEEP THE PLUTONIUM? AND OTHER BY-PRODUCTS?

A. WELL, IRAN, AS A PARTY TO THE NPT, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, HAS AGREED TO PLACE ALL OF ITS UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 052684

NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND THE MATERIAL USED OR PRODUCED UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS, SO THAT ANY PLUTONIUM GENERATED IN REACTORS SOLD TO IRAN -- THESE WOULD BE UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DIVERSION TO UNAUTHORIZED AREAS FOR USE.

Q. TAIWAN AGREED TO THE SAME PROVISION. TAIWAN IS A SIGNATORY TO THE NPT AND WE REQUIRED TAIWAN TO REPROCESS THE PLUTONIUM IN A THIRD COUNTRY.

A. I AM UNABLE TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTION.

Q. THE POINT OF THIS STORY, AS I READ IT, WAS THAT THE REPROCESSING WOULD BE DONE IN IRAN. DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO DISPUTE THAT?

A. WELL WHAT I AM SAYING IS, FIRST, YOUR NEWSPAPER SAID THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED -- AND IT HASN'T BEEN. IT'S UNDER NEGOTIATION. AND THIS QUESTION THAT MR. GELB RAISED, IS A SUBJECT THAT IS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION.

Q. BUT WHAT I AM ASKING YOU IS WHETHER THE UNITED STATES IS DISPOSED TO HAVE THE REPROCESSING DONE IN IRAN.

A. THE ANSWER IS IMPLICITLY "YES" IN MY REPLY TO YOUR QUESTION "THAT IT'S A SUBJECT UNDER NEGOTIATION". SO THEREFORE, WE ARE CONSIDERING IT.

Q. IS THERE ANY OTHER CASE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ALLOWING -- OR ALLOWS TO REPROCESS PLUTONIUM IN THE FOREIGN LANDS UNDER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ANY OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES?

A. I'LL HAVE TO TAKE THAT QUESTION.

Q. CONSIDERING THAT IT DOESN'T MEAN YOU ARE DISPOSED TOWARD IT --

A. I AM SAYING THAT THAT SUBJECT IS UNDER NEGOTIATION --

Q. I DON'T SEE HOW IT'S-- WELL, MAYBE I'M WRONG -- MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAFEGUARDS -- THE AMERICAN SAFEGUARD UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 052684

PROGRAM -- THIS CAME UP WHEN THE EGYPTIAN THING WAS DONE AS OPPOSED, SAY, TO THE CANADIANS WITH THE INDIANS -- WAS THAT SUCH THINGS -- THAT PLUTONIUM HAD TO BE AT LEAST RETURNED, DISPOSED OF. THERE WAS NO WAY YOU COULD NEGOTIATE FOR IRAN TO KEEP THIS STUFF.

COULD YOU AT LEAST GET US A CLEAR READING OF WHAT THE AMERICAN SAFEGUARD PROGRAM IS, IN THIS REGARD?

A. I'LL CHECK INTO THAT, BUT YOU KNOW THIS POINT WAS ALSO MADE BY THE SECRETARY IN THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE IRANIAN MINISTER, ANSARY. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALL THE NUCLEAR PLANTS WOULD BE UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS THAT ARE APPROPRIATE TO SIGNATORIES OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

Q. WELL, I MAY HAVE A MISREADING OF THE SAFEGUARD PROGRAM, BUT WHAT YOU SEEM TO BE SAYING WHEN YOU ARE SAYING IT'S "UNDER NEGOTIATION" IS THAT THEY MAY BE NEGOTIATING A WAY OUT OF A STANDARD SAFEGUARD PROVISION.

A. WELL, I CAN'T GIVE YOU THE EXACT TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED.

Q. WELL, IS IT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES THAT SIGNATORIES TO THE NPT TREATY SHALL BE ALLOWED TO REPROCESS THIS FUEL IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES?

IF NOT, WHAT DOES ARTICLE 4 OF THE NPT TREATY MEAN? THE ARTICLE ENCOURAGES THOSE POWERS WITH NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO DEVELOP PEACEFUL NUCLEAR REACTORS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

A. I THINK WE ARE GETTING INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF

THE NPT THAT I AM JUST NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS AT THIS PARTICULAR BRIEFING. WE WILL TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS AND SEE IF WE CAN PROVIDE YOU MORE ANSWERS ON THAT.

Q. MAYBE YOU WILL ALSO TAKE THE QUESTION: IS IT TRUE THAT UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARD SYSTEM, THE RE-PROCESSING CAN BE DONE IN THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY?

IS IT ALSO TRUE THAT UNDER THE MORE STRICT AMERICAN SAFE-UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 052684

GUARD SYSTEM, THIS IS EXCLUDED?

NOW IF THIS IS TRUE -- IF BOTH ARE TRUE -- THEN EGYPT, WHICH IS NOT A PARTY TO NPT, COULD BE SUBJECT -- AND ISRAEL -- WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A MORE STRICT AMERICAN RULE -- AND IRAN, WHICH IS A PARTY, WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE LESS STRICT, INTERNATIONAL RULES.

Q. BUT JAPAN ISN'T A SIGNATORY TO THE NPT, AND WE LET THEM REPROCESS IN JAPAN.

Q. IS THAT SO?

Q. YES, WE LET THEM.

Q. NO -- BECAUSE IT IS A PARTY TO THE NPT?

Q. NO, IT IS NOT.

Q. OH, WELL THEN I DON'T KNOW. THIS IS HOW I UNDERSTOOD THIS COMPLICATED STRUCTURE.

Q. THAT IS JUST WHY I WANT TO KNOW WHETHER WE HAVE ANY POLICY ABOUT THIS.

Q. JAPANESE PROCESSING IS DONE IN THIS COUNTRY.

Q. YES.

Q. THE JAPANESE ARE ALLOWED TO REPROCESS IN JAPAN, ARE THEY NOT?

A. PARDON ME?

I WAS INTERESTED IN YOUR EXCHANGE, AND I WAS LISTENING VERY CAREFULLY BUT I DIDN'T REALIZE THAT YOU WERE NO TALKING TO ME INSTEAD OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS.

Q. IS IT NOT TRUE THAT OUR AGREEMENT PROVIDING NUCLEAR REACTORS TO JAPAN ALLOWED THEM TO DO THE REPROCESSING IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY?

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 052684

ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT --

A. LET'S TAKE ALL THESE QUESTIONS ON THE NPT AND IF YOU HAVE SOME MORE WE WILL TAKE THOSE AS WELL, AND TRY TO GET YOU ANSWERS.

Q. WHEN YOU ARE TAKING THE QUESTIONS ON THAT, WILL YOU LOOK INTO THE STATUS OF JAPAN'S SIGNATURE OF THE NPT? THEY ARE DEBATING THE QUESTION -- ARE THEY GOING TO SIGN IT OR NOT?

A. I'LL CHECK INTO THAT ALSO. END QUOTE.

LATER ANSWERS WERE SUPPLIED TO THE PRESS FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

Q. WILL THERE BE SAFEGUARDS APPLIED BY THE U.S. IN ADDITION TO THOSE REQUIRED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY?

A. THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN REQUIRED BY U.S. LAW IS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION BY THE PARTIES, CONTRARY TO A STATEMENT IN THE WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE THAT AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED. I CANNOT GIVE YOU THE EXACT TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED. LET ME RECALL WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER POINTED OUT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH IRANIAN MINISTER HUSHARY ANSARY THAT ALL NUCLEAR PLANTS TO BE BUILT IN IRAN WOULD BE UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS THAT ARE APPROPRIATE TO PARTIES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WHICH, OF COURSE, INCLUDES IRAN. I CAN ALSO ASSURE YOU THAT IN OUR NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES ABROAD THERE WILL BE INCLUDED APPROPRIATE ADDITIONAL BILATERAL CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.

Q. WILL IRAN BE PERMITTED TO REPROCESS ITS SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR WILL IT BE REQUIRED TO RETURN THE FUEL TO THE U.S. FOR REPROCESSING?

A. EVEN IN THE CASE OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL, THE U.S. HAS
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 052684

NOT PROPOSED THAT THE FUEL BE RETURNED TO THE U.S. FOR REPROCESSING -- BUT ONLY TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FACILITY OUTSIDE OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL. REGARDING THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH IRAN, WE ARE STILL DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF THE NATURE AND LOCATION OF FACILITIES FOR THE REPROCESSING OF IRANIAN FUEL. IRAN HAS NO NUCLEAR

POWER PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR IN OPERATION AND WILL NOT HAVE A NEED FOR A REPROCESSING CAPABILITY ON A COMMERCIAL SCALE POSSIBLY FOR SEVERAL DECADES. WE WOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, IRAN WOULD ACQUIRE A REPROCESSING CAPABILITY UNDER AGREED ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IS A QUESTION WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE IRANIANS. INGERSOLL UNQUOTE

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESS CONFERENCES, TOSEC 156
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE052684
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: OES/SCI/AE:DBHOULE:MER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750081-0497
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750399/baaaagto.tel
Line Count: 334
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN OES
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: hartledg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 JAN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 JAN 2003 by hagers>; APPROVED <01 MAR 2004 by hartledg>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, US
To: IAEA VIENNA
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006